Frank Sant v. Orlando Jesse Miller : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1949
Frank Sant v. Orlando Jesse Miller : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Harvey A. Sjostrom; Attorney for Appellant;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Sant v. Miller, No. 7277 (Utah Supreme Court, 1949).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1025
' 
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
FRANK SANT, { 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ' 
ORLANDO J~~;E MILLER ) 
Defendant and Respondent. \ 
Appellant's 
Brief 
Uase No. 7277 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial 
District of the State of Utah, in and for the 
County of Cache. 
fTon. Marriner M. Morrison, Judge. 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
FRANK SANT, 
Plaintiff and ~-ippellant, 
-vs-
ORLANDO JESSE MILLER 




Case No. 7277 
This appeal is taken from a judgment of the Honor-
able Marriner ~{. ~Iorrison, whereby and wherein on the 
lOth day of September,--1948, he directed a verdict in 
favor of the defendant, no cause of action and entering 
judgment thereon ,on the lOth day of September, 1948. 
PLEADINGS 
The plaintiff set forth in his Amended Complaint 
that on the 24th day .of January, 1947, the defendant 
negligently and carelessly run plaintiff down with a 
car under his control on Main Street, between Center 
and First South in the city of Logan, Utah; that plaintiff 
was standing on said ~fain Street about 60 or 70 feet 
north of the cross-walk at First South and Main Street 
waiting for a car proceeding in a southerly direction 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
followed by defendant's car on the west half 
of said street, when defendant, while going over 30 miles 
an hour, a short distance north of plaintiff (30 feetL 
swerved to the left of the car proceeding him for the 
purpose of passing said car and in so doing crashed into 
plaintiff who was standing east of the defendant's line 
of travel, prior to defendant turning to pass said pro-
ceeding car; that ~efendant was negligent in failing to 
keep a proper lookout before attempting to pass the 
car ahead; that he was in violation of City Ordinance 
and State Statutes as to speed, and failing to slow up 
when approaching an intersection; that he failed to give 
any warning of his intention to pass; that plaintiff was 
damaged in the sum o f$13,171.50 for personal injuries, 
etc. (Tr. 20-24) 
AMENDED ANSWER 
The answer admits all the allegations of the com-
plaint except the negligence and damages charged and 
makes a plea of contributory negligence of the plaintiff 
in the following particulars : In plaintiff negligently 
failing to yield the right of way to defendant; in negli-
gently attempting to cross· said street at a place other 
than in a 1narked cross-walk; in failing to exercise reas-
onable care for his own safety; in failing to keep a 
proper lookout for automobiles; in walking or running 
directly into the path of car driven by defendant; in 
leaving a place of safet~~ and going into a place of danger 
and not remaining in a place of safety, or stopping, 
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or stepping back to avoid eollision. ( Tr. 29, 30) 
Defendant further filed an a1nend.Inent to his answer 
alleging violation of Logan l~ity Ordinance by plaintiff 
as being the proxiluate cause of his injury ( Tr. 31) which 
is denied by plaintiff ('rr. 33). Defendant then filed 
another an1endJnent to answer (Tr. 37) of the sa1ne 
nature as the first and which was stipluated as being 
denied by plaintiff ( Tr. 318). 
To this Amended Answer plaintiff filed a reply 
denying said contributory negligence (Tr. 34) and also 
filed an Amended paragraph 5 to his amended complaint 
setting out additional injuries to plaintiff and demand-
ing damages in the sum of $25,171.50 ( Tr. 35, 36). 
THE EVIDENCE 
Main Street, Logan, l~tah, whereon the accident 
took place was 90 feet wide from curb to curb, was 
free fro1n snow, but so1newhat wet and was so well 
lighted that a person could be seen for a block .or 40 
rods at the time of the accident, (Tr. 215,216,217) 
which was about mid-night. There are street car tracks 
running north and south on the said street, the west 
rail being 4 feet east of the center of the street ( Tr. 218). 
After being struck Mr. Sant was lying approximately 
36 feet and 8 inches east from the curb on the west side 
of the street and 16 feet and 3 inches from the cross-
walk on the south; the point of i1npact so far as it could 
be deter1nined by the police \Vas 78 feet and 8 inches 
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from the cross-walk, a difference of 62 feet and 6 inche:-~ 
from where impact seemed to be and point of rest of 
Mr. Sant after being struck, and 1\fr. Sant was "laying-
right at the side just ahead of the left rear wheel of 
the car'' ( Tr. 219, 220, 221, 222). The car showed in .. 
dentation on left side of hood and the rear view 1nirror 
was broken off (Tr. 227). The evidence further shows 
that Mr~ Miller by his own adn1ission at the time of the 
accident ''pulled out around another car just previous 
to this accident in an attempt to make the light, because 
he was in a hurry''. That he ''had to get home so he 
could go into Idaho the next morning early". (Tr. 235). 
~hat he was going 30 miles an hour. (Tr. 235, 236). 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 
Errors comitted by the trial Court upon which 
appellant relies for a reversal of judgment. 
1. The Court erred in granting defendant's motion 
for a directed verdict in favor of said defendant and 
against the plaintiff and entering judgment thereon. 
2. The Court erred in failing to grant plaintiff's 
motion for a directed verdict in his favor and against 




We assume it will not be necessary to repeat the 
evidence as disclosed by the statement of fact except 
as it is necessary to point out the law applicable thereto. 
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The plaintiff and appellant adn1its that prior (so1ne 
4 or 5 seconds) to the accident that he was crossing 
in an unmarked cross"~alk and fro1n the east to the 
west of Main Street in Logan, lTtah, at the time in 
question. But by that "~e do not admit that he was 
crossing and in violation of la": at the titne of the colli-
sion. The crossing had ceased and we believe he occu-
pied the san1e legal status as one whom might have 
been f.orcably placed there against his will for we do 
not believe it can be said that he was crossing at the 
time of said accident and therefore in violation of law. 
He had ceased to w:alk 4 or 5 seconds prior to the 
collision. 
The question as we see it, now, is in arguing assign-
ment of error No. 1. Whether the Court was right in 
directing a verdict in favor of the defendant at the 
instance or motion of opposing counsel, keeping in 
mind that we must take the evidence most favorable 
to the plaintiff in this case. The evidence conclusively 
shows that plaintiff was standing and had been standing 
where he was struck 4 or 5 second with his wife waiting 
for a car just ahead of defendant and defendants to 
pass, before he was struck, that defendant's car was 
at least 10 feet to the \vest of \vhere plaintiff \Vas and 
that he was standing not less than 36 feet 8 inches east 
of the west curb and about 78 feet 8 inches north of 
the cross walk at First South and "Jiain Street. In all 
probability he was further east than this because he 
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says he had just stepped over the west rail of the track 
which is 4 feet east of the center of the street. 
We assume that even though it can be said that 
plaintiff was crossing, though standing, and in viola-
tion of law at the very time of the accident that counsel 
will not 1naintain that without more appearing that 
said violation was the proximate cause of the collision 
and injury. This Court has never laid down such rule 
of law to our knowledge nor has any other. To this 
effect is 38 Am. Jur. pp. 899 on negligence. Also Brown 
v. McCuan 132 Pac. (2) 838. This being so the Court 
below could not properly direct a verdict on that ground 
nor did it so do, but upon the ground .of plaintiff's fail-
ure to look and that he was in the act of stepping 
forward at the time of being struck. The record is 
absolutely void of any evidence showing or tending 
to show that plaintiff was moving forward at the time 
of collision, but is to the contrary-that he had been 
standing 4 or 5 seconds waiting for defendant to pass 
to the west of him as above pointed out in our statement 
of the evidence. 
If we are correct 1n this the .only other question 
is this: Was the plaintiff guilty of cont,ributory negli-
gence as a matter of law which was the proximate cause, 
when he took his eyes off defendant's car and the car 
proceeding defendant's and looked in a southwest direc-
tion for his friends for what rnust not have been over 
a second of time, or n1ore likely a fraction thereof. 
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for he says '~ ,v·hile standing there for those cars to 
advance I looked to 1ny left to see 'vhere our companions 
were. N O\V anyone can tell you about as well front 
there as I can. That's "·here I \vas-just as I turned 
and looked is "yhere I was struck." ( Tr. 125). It must 
be remen1bered in this connection that defendant's car 
was north and \Ye~t of \Yhere plaintiff and his wife 
were :standing and going south. (Tr. 187). We n1ust 
under the evidence accept that. If the said cars had 
been straight north of hlln and coming at the said 30 
miles an hour right for him he may have been guilty 
of negligence by shifting his eyes to the southwest for 
even a second, but this is not the case. The cars were 
to the west of him. That being so can it be said he was 
guilty of negligence in failing to anticipate that defen-
dant within what must have been a very short distance 
from him to suddenly and abruptly swerve to pass the 
car ahead, for ~Irs. Sant testifying said, ''We stopped 
in the street, and by that time they were closer (meaning 
the cars) to us and there was the head car coming 
rather slow, and the other car was back a short way, 
and as he came up to the head car he served from 
behind the car, just came out and rode the steering 
wheel and came around the .other car and it was coming 
rather fast, and I said 'l\1y Heavens', look out. And 
I stepped back and before we knew it there was a 
terrific sound.'' And as she stated she was wearing 
her coat loosly around her shoulders and the car took 
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it from her person. The coat was "jerked from me." 
(Tr. 257, 258). 
Mr. Sant testified that after having a meal at Dick's 
Cafe which is on the east side of Main Street and slight-
ly north of where the accident took place that he pro-
ceeded to cross Main Street in a westerly direction: 
(Tr. 123, 124) that when he had just crossed the west 
rail of the track he saw cars to the north and stopped 
and ''while standing there for those cars to advance, 
I looked to my left to see where our companions were. 
Now anyone can tell you about as well from there as .I 
can. That's where I was-just as I turned and looked 
is where I was struck" (Tr. 125). At the time he was 
struck he had his ''right arm through her left arm'' 
(n1eaning his wife's) (Tr. 126) and had been stopp~d 
"two or three or four seconds" (Tr. 128). That when 
he sa\v cars coming from the north on the west side of 
the street going south the cars ''were nearer to the 
west curb'' they were west of him going south and he 
didn't see ''any cars in the center of the street or along 
the track at all. No cars were heading for him but were 
towards the west curb. (Tr. 187) And there were no 
cars parked at the west curb at the place of accident. 
(Tr. 190) 
Mrs. Sant, wife of plaintiff, testified that she saw 
cars coming from the north and as the cars approached 
she and Mr. Sant stopped, her left arm through his 
right arm and that ''We stopped in the street, and by 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
that time they 'Yere closer to us and there was-the 
head car "~as coining rather slow, the other car was 
back a short 'vay::;, and as he came up to the head car he 
s\verved fron1 behind the car, just can1e out and rode the 
steering \\""heel and crune around the car, and it was 
coining rather fast and I said ·'illy Heavens! look out!'' 
and I stepped back and before 'Ye knew it there was a 
terrific ~ound.' · That she \Yas wearing her coat loosely 
around her shoulders and the car took the coat from 
her. ( Tr. 257, 238) And testifying further she stated: 
~~We were standing here and the cars were coming 
about so-style. We'll say just a little-is this West'1 
~'Q. Yes." 
A. '~About like this coming up, and this car was 
coming slow. Mr. nfiller came up here and swerved 
and came out here, and here we stood. And I stepped 
back like this and evidently l\Ir. Sant did not and it hit 
him." (Tr. 259, ~60) That before her husband was 
~truck they had been waiting in the road "3 .or 4 or 5 
seconds, hard to determine'' ( Tr. 272). 
From this evidence it is apparent that Mr. Miller as 
he overtook the car ahead he swerved to the left a short 
distance from where plaintiff and his wife were stand-
ing waiting for the cars to pass. That Mr. Sant was 
struck by defendant, coming fron1 the north, just as he 
turned and looked in a south\vesterly direction; that 
.:VI rs. Sant saw the dPfendant as he ~''rerved to the left 
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of the car ahead to pass and that defendant's car caught 
~lrs. Sant's coat as she stepped back to avoid being 
struck. Mr. Miller testified that he did not swerve, but 
drove straight ahead which was in contradiction to what 
he told police officer Austin Frank at the time of the 
accident. (Tr. 235) He, Miller, further testified he did 
not see the Sants until he struck Mr. Sant. (Tr. 287) 
That Mr. Sant was greatly injured and damaged 
by said accident is proven by the evidence beyond all 
question and we do not believe counsel will dispute it 
so we pass the details by. ( Tr. 191, 192) 
That we must take the evidence most favorable to 
the appellant in this case is settled law: 
Barlow v. Utah Light and Traction Co. 
77 Utah 556, 298 P. 386. 
Ricks v. Budge 91 Utah 307, 64 P. (2) 208 
1Iiller v. White 70 Utah 145-258 P. 565. 
Roach v. Railroad Co., 69 Utah, 530 256 P. 1061. 
Uhr v. Eaten, 95 Utah, 309, 80 P. (2) 925. 
Graham v. Johnson, et al 166 P. (2) 230. 
After all the evidence was in the defendant made 
a motion for a directed verdict in his favor on the 
ground that plaintiff's own ~vidence showed contribut-
ory negligence on his part which was granted, (Tr. 312, 
315, 87) and gave defendant judgment on the verdict. 
(Tr. 88) 
In ~esponse to the judge's request that Mr. Steed 
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sign the verdict, ~f r. Steed said: ~~Yes, I'll sign it. I• ve 
got to, but it's against 1ny 'vishes. '' 
In his direction to the jury to find for the defendant 
and against the plaintiff the judge recites that the testi-
mony of ~lr. Sant · ~,vith respect to the injury to his left 
leg \Ya~ the effect that he probably was just taking a 
step when the car hit his right leg.'' ( Tr. 315) No such 
testin1ony "\vas given and the record does not show it 
which was called to the judge's attention at the con· 
elusion of his remarks, but to no avail. 
The Court held that plaintiff did not keep a proper 
lookout and he was apparently taking a step forward at 
time of being struck and therefore was guilty of con-
tributory negligence as a 1natter of law, and directed a 
verdict of no cause of action. (Tr. 315) 
The plaintiff, too, made a motion for a directed 
verdict and that the only question to be left to the jury 
was one of damages. This was denied. (Tr. 313) 
In Section 1450 Blashfield on automobile law it is 
stated that a pedestrian crossing between intersections 
and in violation of the ordinance is not guilty of negli-
gence by failing to anticipate the action of a motorist 
in suddenly changing his course and running him down. 
To the same effect is 87 Atlantic 339, 109 Atlantic 608. 
This is in line with 38 An1. Jur. pp 871 Sec. 191, which 
reads in part, ''ordinarily his failure to anticipate negli-
gence does not constitute negligence on his part and 
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will not defeat an action by him for the injuries sus-
tained". To the same effect is l\'lcCulloch v. Horton 56 
Pac. (2) 1344. 
Moreno v. Los Angeles Transfer Co. 186 P. 800. 
Another question that might be put is this: Wa~ 
the plaintiff negligent in momentarily, which must not 
have been a second's time, taking his eyes off the cars 
to the north and west of hirn going south~ We think 
not. . Here plaintiff had no reason to, nor would a 
prudent person under all circumstances, believe that 
defendant would suddenly change his course and run 
him down. To this effect is Dicks v. Wilson, 56 P. (2) 
1036. Michel v. Rosenfield 255 P .. 760. 38 Am. Jur. 
pp. 867 sec 190 and same volume pp. 860 sec 184. In 
the case of Western and A. R. Co. v. Ferguson 39 S. E. 
54, the Court said that the duty imposed by law upon 
all persons to exercise ordinary care to avoid the conse-
quences of another's negligence does not arise until 
the negligence of such other is existing, and is either 
apparent or the circumstances are such that an o.rdinary 
prudent person would have reason to apprehend its 
existance. And in Walker v. St. Paul City R. Company, 
84 N. W. 222 th~ Court held that one who is called upon 
~ 
to exercise care to a void danger from the acts of others 
may, in regulating his own conduct, have regard to the 
probable or apprehended conduct of such persons and 
to the presumption that they will act with reasonabh~ 
caution, and not with. culpable negligence. 
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There is also the further fact in this case that 
:Jlns. Sant '"·as looking at the actual time that defendant 
suddenly s,,~erved to the left of the proceeding car and 
gaYe ilnn1ediate outcry to ""look out". Can it not be 
said that at the tin1e ~lr. 8ant turned his head to the 
south,vest his wife was his lookout and he could rely 
upon her to give ample warning if any danger appeared 
from the north. VVT e think so. 
We assmne that defendant's counsel will not take 
the position that defendant was not guilty of negligence 
which was the proxin1ate cause of the collision and 
injury complained of, for the record is replete from 
defendent's own testimony to that effect. For Mr. 
~filler testified, as stated before tha~ he did not see 
the Sants until he struck ~Ir. Sant (Tr. 278) and did not 
even attempt to explain this away. And this Court 
has held upon numerous appeals that a driver of a 
car is held to see what is in plain sight and could have 
seen if he had looked. And California together with 
all other Courts have followed this common sense rule. 
The Supreme Court of California said in the case of 
Johnson v. J-ohnson 31 P. (2) 237 that it is· a part of 
the duty of the operator of a motor vehicle to keep 
his rnachine always under control, so as to avoid colli-
sion with other cars and other persons using the high-
way. He has no right to assume that the road is clear~ 
but under all circurnstances and al all times he must 
be vigilent and must anticipate and expect the presence 
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of others. Accordingly the fact that he did not know 
that anyone was on the highway, is no excuse for the 
conduct, which would have amounted to recklessness, if 
he had known that another vehicle or person was on 
the highway. And as has heretofore been pointed out 
an object such as a rnan, could have been seen a block 
away at the time of the accident. 
CONCLUSION 
Under the facts, circumstances and law, the Court 
below could not say that plaintiff was guilty as a matter 
of law of contributory negligence proximately causing 
said accident and injuries and that question of contrib-
utory negligence should have gone to the jury together 
with the other issues of the case. To say the least, the 
issue of contributory negligence of plaintiff was one 
for the jury, and we feel that the Court invaded the 
province of the jury as reasonable men might differ 
as to such alleged contributory negligence and if that 
be so, this Court has held in many cases where such 
is the case, it is a case that must be submitted to the 
JUry. We believe that no cases need be cited to this 
Court to sustain such view. 
We further believe -that the Court should have 
directed a verdict for the plaintiff, on the argurnent 
here used on our first assignrnent of error and will not 
repeat except to add this: Defendant 'vas duty bound 
to see plaintiff in the street and to have avoided hin1 
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taking as true defendant's o'vn testi1nony, and we believe 
the fore1nan of the jury was right when he said, ''Yes, 
I'll sign it, I've got to, but it's against my wishes." (Tr. 
316). 
"\V. e respectfully request that the decision~MJ~rl judg-
ment be reversed and a new trial granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Harvey A. Sjostrom, 
Attorney for Appellant. 
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